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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROSALEE P. COMER, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ) 
LAWRENCE J. COMER, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) Civil No. 924 201 
) Appellate No. 94-0009-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Appellee concurs with the statements contained in the 
"Statement of Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals" contained in 
Appellant's Brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Is there sufficient evidence in the record to support 
the trial courtf s finding that the appreciation in a fund 
Appellant inherited during the marriage of the parties had been 
commingled and had been protected and secured by the efforts of 
Appellee that this appreciation should be treated as marital 
property and thus divided between the parties? 
2. Did the trial court properly consider the parties 
handling of inherited property during a 34-year marriage whereby 
Appellee's inheritance received 21 years before the divorce was 
used for family support and to pay off the mortgage on the family 
home should be offset against Appellant's inheritance received 6 
years later which was held by the parties for retirement? 
3. Was there sufficient evidence in the record to support 
the trial court's award of alimony to Appellee? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellee concurs with the Standard of Review and 
Governing Statute contained in Appellant's Brief on the standard 
of review for findings of fact except to add that the findings 
made by the Court in contested financial matters are presumed 
correct. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992). 
All the issues before the court are issues of fact and therefore 
the standard of review for conclusions of law is not applicable. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The statute which governs this matter is Section 30-3-5(1) 
(U.C.A. 1953 as amended), which provides in relevant part: 
"When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the 
Court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or 
obligations, and parties." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee basically agrees with the "Statement of the Case" 
contained in Appellant's Brief, pages 2-3. Essentially the 
reasoning of the court is contained in his decision given from 
the bench following the trial after the final arguments of 
counsel which is found on pages 109-114 of the transcript (see 
Addendum 2). The trial court also participated often in the 
trial itself because of the way it was presented. The Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree which are contained in 
Appellant's Appendix also reflect the lower court's decision. 
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The reasoning of the trial court and its decision will be 
discussed infra in the Argument portion of this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant complains that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding alimony and in how the court handled the 
inheritances of both parties. This appeal does not involve any 
question as to property division, retirement funds, life 
insurance or attorney fees and, therefore, no reference will be 
made to these unrelated issues. 
The "Statement of the Facts" contained in Appellant's Brief, 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-8) while directly reciting some of the 
evidence available to the trial court failed to give this Court a 
total view of all of the evidence presented at trial. Basically, 
Appellant relies upon his own case in establishing a "fact" 
without reference to the evidence presented by Appellee. 
Appellant also lists many "facts" that are totally irrelevant to 
the issues on appeal. 
The Appellee points out these additional facts to clarify 
Appellant's statement. 
1. The financial needs of the parties following the divorce 
will be basically the same. (TR p. 92-93, see Addendum 1). 
Appellee has serious health problems and her only access to 
health insurance will cost her $100 more per month than Appellant 
and this coverage will end in three years. 
2. Appellant's attorney conceded in his closing argument 
that Appellant should be awarded permanent alimony and that 
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amount should be $500 per month. (TR p. 108, lines 5-15, see 
Addendum 2). 
3. This was not a regular trial where witnesses were sworn 
and testified. Most of the evidence was either by pre-trial 
stipulation or proffer. The trial court was actively involved 
with the consent of both attorneys through the full hearing. The 
contested areas were discussed and clarified as the case 
progressed. 
The Appellant has failed to marshal all of the evidence 
relevant to the findings and then tried to show the findings to 
be clearly erroneous as is required under the appellate standard 
of review. Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1990); 
Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647, (Utah 1988). 
Since the trial court was not required to merely view this 
divorce in light of the contentions and evidence offered by the 
Appellant but was required to view the evidence as a whole, it is 
submitted that when the entire record is reviewed there is ample 
justification for the trial court's decision. Appellee shall not 
attempt to marshal all of the evidence in this case which is 
clearly the burden of Appellant but will instead list significant 
factors in each argument where appropriate which have been 
omitted from the Statement of Facts contained in Appellant's 
Brief which undoubtedly affected the trial court's judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court, based on competent evidence at trial, 
properly found that the accumulations on funds inherited by 
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Appellant was a marital asset and, thus, should be equitably 
divided because such accumulations were obtained by the efforts 
of Appellee investing and managing the funds and by the use of 
joint marital funds to pay income tax liability on these funds 
while these funds were held in taxable investments. The Appellee 
acknowledged that she has not helped in any way with the 
apartments the Appellant inherited in Lehi, Utah, either by 
helping with management or investment strategy or by investing 
marital earnings to maintain this real property and, therefore, 
she made no claim on this, 
2. The trial court based on competent evidence at trial 
found that during the course of a 34-year marriage, the parties 
had made a mutual decision to use the Appellee's inheritance 
to pay off the mortgage debt of the marital house and living 
expenses for the family because that was the marital need at that 
time. Six years later, they chose to invest Appellant's 
inheritance of cash into a retirement fund, most of which was put 
in joint names, which they jointly managed, because that was the 
marital need at that time. The court thereby made an equitable 
division of the property by giving each credit for the principal 
amounts of their respective inheritance against the assets they 
had accumulated at the time of the divorce. 
3. The trial court based on the evidence presented at trial 
made the necessary findings or had such information presented or 
stipulated by the attorneys at trial to properly set alimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE FACTS IN THE RECORD SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT THE APPRECIATION ON THE FUNDS 
INHERITED BY THE APPELLANT AND HELD FOR 15 YEARS 
PRIOR TO THE DIVORCE HAD BECOME SUBJECT TO 
DIVISION IN THE DIVORCE 
Appellee agrees with the legal argument presented by 
Appellant about how inherited property and its appreciation 
should generally be handled in a divorce except to add the 
additional exception cited in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, (Utah 
App. 1990) which includes at page 1169: "other extraordinary 
situations where equity so demands" or as stated in Finlavson v. 
Finlavson, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 1994) at page 23 "and 
whether the distribution achieves a fair, just and equitable 
result". 
There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial 
court's finding that the appreciation to these funds had lost its 
nature of being separate property and as such should be divided. 
Despite contrary evidence that Appellant presented at trial and 
re-argues with this appeal, the trial court who saw and heard the 
witnesses and the attorneys, chose not to accept that position. 
Appellant's burden on this appeal is clearly stated in Finlavson 
at page 23 as follows: 
"This court will approve changes in a trial court's 
property and debt distribution 'only if there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the findings or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion'." 
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The trial court clearly set forth the factual basis from the 
evidence presented at trial for the inclusion of the appreciation 
on the fund as part of the estate to be divided, (see TR p. 112, 
see Addendum 2). 
1. The fund was held by the parties for 16 years, a 
considerable length of time. 
2. It was managed by both of them. 
3. Plaintiff was listed as a co-owner on the larger of the 
two funds. 
4. Taxes from the earnings were paid from marital funds 
which thus protected the money within the fund. 
This action is in conformity with the law cited by Appellant 
and set forth above and should be sustained. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE INHERITED 
PROPERTY OF EACH PARTY IN DIVIDING THE ASSETS 
The unfairness of Appellant's position is so evident that a 
reply is hardly necessary. Appellee received her inheritance at 
a time when the parties needs were such that it was spent for 
family support and to payoff the mortgage on the family home 
where the parties continued to live without future mortgage 
payments. If that were all, Appellee would agree that except for 
a claim of $2000 for the payoff on the home mortgage, her claim 
for separate property of her inheritance was lost. But six years 
later, the Appellant inherited property from his family. He 
keeps the land in Lehi and the Appellee has had nothing to do 
with it and makes no claims on the asset. On the other hand, the 
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cash fund was jointly invested and managed for their retirement. 
The trial court could have disregarded any inheritance claim and 
split what was left of the assets the parties considered joint, 
but chose to protect each parties' original investment principal. 
The trial court correctly considered the history of the 34-year 
marriage and did not isolate the continuing events to avoid a 
great injustice and harsh result now sought by Appellant. 
Had Appellant's parents died 22 years ago and that money used to 
support the family and payoff the house mortgage and Appellee's 
father died six years later and the family decision had been to 
invest that property into a retirement fund would Appellant 
concede that his inheritance is fully lost but Appellee's 
inheritance is hers. Appellant's argument does not consider the 
context of the marriage. Where parties have been married for 
many years and the asset involved is not a unique piece of 
property where that specific asset has a special tie to the 
family passing it down to an heir, the court should not look at 
each transaction in isolation but as a part of the whole family 
operation. The trial court's decision is certainly equitable in 
light of this long marital history and within the discretion 
granted to him by law. 
Ill 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO SUSTAIN THE AWARD OF 
ALIMONY AT $750 PER MONTH. 
While the Appellee agrees with the general statement of law 
regarding alimony set forth by Appellant, again the statement is 
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not complete. As the court stated in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 
240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1994): 
"The general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving 
spouse from becoming a public charge and to maintain to the 
extent possible the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
In determining whether to award alimony and in setting 
the amount, the trial court must consider (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to provide for him or 
herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 
1992). When "the payor spouse's resources are adequate, 
alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic needs, 
but should also consider the recipient spouse's station in 
life." Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212; accord Martinez v. 
Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991)." 
The court found Appellee's income at $450 per month and 
Appellant's base salary at $1846 and over $3,000 with overtime. 
Both facts are clearly supported on the record. While the court 
did not specifically state Plaintiff's need for the amount he 
set, he did clearly state earlier that the needs of the parties 
were about the same. Appellant's evidence was he needed $1410 if 
he continued to live in the house or $1910 if he moved out and 
rented a comparable place. Appellee's affidavit was similar. 
Appellee's actual expenditures at the time of the trial where she 
was living with another family to make ends meet without any 
support or alimony from Appellant should not be considered her 
long term need for setting alimony after 34 years of marriage and 
the great earning differences. Appellant's attorney even 
conceded in his closing argument that permanent alimony was 
appropriate. He argued the amount should be $500 per month and 
the court set $750 per month. The $750 plus $450 salary for 
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Appellee is $1200 per month, which is less than Appellee's needs 
especially when access to health insurance which costs her about 
$100 a month more than Appellant and her limited access to health 
care are considered. Appellant's income is reduced with this 
award to about $1100 for his generated base salary or $2250 when 
overtime is included which he has always had. The argument that 
Appellee should live on her investments ignores the fact that the 
court divided all the marital assets equally except $19,000 for 
the balance of the inherited fund and the land in Lehi which 
Appellant kept. The Appellant likewise has the returns on the 
marital investments to live on and make alimony payments. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to really capture in a transcript the human 
part of this case. A man after 34 years of marriage wants to 
keep all of the property he has received from his family after 
earlier spending his wife's inheritance. The wife acknowledges 
that she has no claim to land some distance away but she has a 
claim to a fund in which she was involved and was jointly 
invested and held for their retirement. The trial judge did an 
excellent job of addressing the problems and crafting an order 
that brought some fairness to the situation to the parties but 
still let the husband keep the principal of his inheritance after 
deducting the benefit he got from his wife's inheritance and 
based his alimony on a base salary although he has historically 
made over fifty percent (50%) more. This order should be 
affirmed because it is right and it is supported by the law and 
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the facts. To require a remand and further consideration is 
wasting judicial time and adding unnecessary costs to this case. 
Appellant should be ordered to pay Appellee's attorney fees and 
costs of this appeal because the appeal is frivolous and without 
merit. 
Dated this / 1 day of July, 1994. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C. 
/w 
Lylel W. Hillyard 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
(original signature) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to the following this 
/ 7 day of July, 1994: 
Gregory Skabelund 
Attorney for Appellant 
2176 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
i 
Hillyard ?  Q k^ 
(original signature) 
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ADDENDUM 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, pages 92-93 Addendum 1 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, page 108-114 Addendum 2 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Q Medical and dental care, you indicate it costs $75 
a month, that's above your insurance? 
A Well, now, this, I don't know. It depends. It's 
if you're sick or not. 
THE COURT: Let me just interrupt if I can here. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir . 
THE COURT: Just watching the clock. 
It would seem to me that perhaps Counsel ought to 
be able to stipulate, these parties' monthly expenses ought 
to be somewhat comparable, whether they're as low as one 
side says or as high as the other; I recognize one will be 
higher and one lower, but I wouldn't expect that—there to 
be a range of one being two or three hundred percent of the 
other . 
MR. SKABELUND: Well, there's three things that we 
need to look at here. First and foremost, my client's 
paying $250 for his new car, she's not paying anything for 
her car . 
Second, she has people living with her to share 
the costs and expenses, including rental and utilities. 
THE COURT: But those are choices. Your client 
could choose to live with three people and split that; in 
other words, those are choices. I guess what I'm getting 
at, if there's anything unique about these individuals 
that's going to cause one to have higher expenses than the 
92 
1
 other, I'd be interested in that. If there isn't, it seems 
2
 to me that we've really belabored the point on both sides, 
3
 you know, because given their ages, their expenses ought to 
4
 be somewhat comparable, whatever they are. 
5 MR. SKABELUND: Well, and that's~~of course, those 
6
 choices are the things that affect the~~the amount of 
7
 alimony. I can't help it if she's made those choices, or 
8 the choices my client's made. 
9 THE COURT: Well, but I mean, even the choicethat 
10 your client left his money in savings and got a car with a 
11 loan, and the choice that your client wants to maintain the 
12 house; I think that's understandable. I--I understand why 
13 he's doing it, it's probably a good choice; but those aren't 
14 choices that should impact the amount of alimony. 
15 It seems to me he could, you know, he's free to 
16 make those either way and certainly he has the right to make 
1"7 I those choices, but they shouldn't push) the alimony figure up 
or down. 
MR. SKABELUND: Well, they should, I think they do 
20 reflect it. I think always the-~the ability of the other 
21 spouse to provide support is an issue. Now, these are 
22 necessities, these are needs. 
23 THE COURT: But if--if Mr. Hillyard's client went 
24 out and bought a new condo now and had a $900 house payment 
25 per month, are you saying that that ought to affect the 
93 
18 
19 
6 
1
 MR. COMER: Not matched, six percent of---
2
 I MR. SKABELUND: Excuse me, six percent of that is 
matched, with the amount that he puts in—in with that 
4
 account . 
5 J I don't see anything extremely overly broad or why 
there's any other unnecessary expenses that are placed 
7
 I against his paycheck. I think Commissioner Garner was 
8
 correct, there's no question this is an alimony case, 
9
 there's no question that this is a long-term marriage and 
10 that Mrs. Comer is entitled to alimony f or—permanent 
11 alimony; but the question is is the amount before this 
12 Court . 
13 uie think that the $500 figure was fair, we think 
14
 it was equitable and we'd ask that the Court follow the 
15 c o m m i s s i o n e r ' s recommenda t i on . 
16 I Furthermore, there's no question that Mrs. Comer 
has the ability to work. I thought it was really 
interesting to note that she goes bowling e^ery week. This 
Court should take into consideration that she has not 
applied for a job, hasn't done anything to find any 
employment for the last five years. At the very least, this 
Court should give her a minimum wage of approximately 746 
per month, which is the minimum wage standard in computing 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24
 an a l i m o n y award 
25 Furthermore, the — should take into consideration 
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Cobra premiums, I'll require that the plaintiff pay those. 
She'll be eligible pursuant to the statute, for 36 months 
following the entry of the divorce decree. 
Going to allow the defendant to purchase the 
family home for the appraised value of $61,000, paying half 
that amount to the plaintiff. No restrictions on any 
subsequent sale. 
With regards to alimony — 
MR. HILLYARD: Your Honor, could I have a time? 
One of the arguments we've had is--is how soon is he to 
pay—we'd like it paid immediately or very quickly. 
THE COURT: Within 30 days after entry of the 
decree . 
MR. HILLYARD: Okay. 
THE COURT: With regards to alimony, I want to 
make a clear record of how the Court views it and I 
recognize that it can be viewed differently by various 
courts. I'm going to accept the plaintiff's current 
earnings of $450 a month. I think there's some question, it 
certainly could be argued that we should impute at least 
minimum wage, that she may be able to work 800 —or earn $800 
a month, possibly it could be argued she could work 
overtime; but I'm going to accept the 450 and say that's her 
i ncorne , ear ning . 
With regards to the defendant, it appears to the 
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Court that his monthly gross without overtime is $1,846, 
with gross, it's just over 3,000 per month--or with 
overtime, that is. 
I'm going to set the alimony award at $750 a 
month. Essentially that will come very close to equalizing 
the incomes of the parties, or the money of the parties, 
with the exception of the overtime, and while I 'm-I «m sure 
the defendant feels that's a substantial alimony award, in 
the Court's view, it's leaving most or all of the overtime 
earnings with the defendant, and so I don't think it's at 
all out of line as far as the amount. 
I'm going to order that that be due and payable, 
the first payment October 1st, 1993, and due and payable on 
the first day of each month thereafter. 
MR. SKABELUNO: Your Honor, with respect to that 
alimony award, would the Court be inclined to allow him to 
make half on the 5th and half on the 20th of each month? 
That's quite a chunk to come up with at one time. 
THE COURT: Well, we'll make it the 1st and 15th, 
if that's going to fit his needs. That may be better for 
the plaintiff as well. 
MR. SKABELUND: Okay . 
THE COURT: One-half on the 1st, one-half on thej 
15th, commencing October 1. 
With regards to attorney's fees, in view of thd 
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there's some discretion here 
's fair „ Let me make just a 
The original net inheritance of the defendant has 
been estimated at 22 to 26, 
the benefit of the doubt and 
a littl 
of cons 
000 Let me give the defendant 
say it was 26,000. The Court's 
e troubled here, though, 
istency. 
You know, it's di 
with the defendant in terms 
fficuJt to argue what yours is 
ours and what's mine is mine. 
happene 
ours . 
uasn ' t 
d with the plaintiff 's 
And that's essentially what 
inheritance; what's yours is 
Her inheritance, according to the testimony, and it 
disputed, went into 
expenses and purposes . 
7,000, 
leaves 
I 'm goi ng to take 
which was the amount 
an original net of 
follows: From the property 
estimat ed at about 45,000, 
the 
th 
th 
19, 
in 
19, 
family home and other family 
at 26,000 and deduct from it 
e plaintiff inherited. That 
000. I'm going to order as 
those two accounts, which is 
000 will first be paid to the 
defendant, as his separate inheritance; all of the remaining 
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1
 ibalance is to be split evenly. The earnings during the 
2 (marriage to be divided, as well as the 7,000 as an offset 
3 for the inheritance originally received by plaintiff. 
4
 I The Court notes that the property's been held by 
5 I these parties, one or both, for about 16 years, a 
6 considerable length of time, it has been managed by both 
7
 of them, that the plaintiff's name was placed on the larger 
8 of the two accounts and that the taxes for all of the 
9 earnings on this came from marital funds rather than from 
10 the accounts themselves. And so the Court believes that 
11 there is somewhat of a commingling issue, even though the 
12 account is clearly traceable, and it's identifiable as 
13 having been inherited and always stayed in that account. 
14 The taxes were paid by earnings of the parties outside of 
15 the account . 
16 I believe that covers all of the issues, with the 
17 exception of those that were recited as having been 
18
 stipulated at the beginning. 
19 MR. HILLYARD: I think for the magic, you need to 
20 say the divorce is granted, goes to~~ 
2\ THE COURT: That's correct. The divorce will be 
22 granted based on the testimony given by the plaintiff. 
23 The personal property, the rnotorhome, as were 
24 indicated at the beginning of the proceedings, and it was| 
25 stipulated by both parties, all of the banks accounts to bel 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
W 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
divided 50-50, and I will note and allow it to be included 
in the decree, if- any other accounts or funds are 
discovered, that it's the Court's intention that they would 
be divided 50-50, that's how the personal property has been 
handled . 
MR. SKABELUND: Your Honor, with respect to the 
dlim^ny award, customarily, Judge Low has been having a 
review within two years. Would the Court be inclined to 
review on this? 
THE COURT: I really wouldn't. I'd say we'll 
review whenever there's a sufficient change in circumstances 
and that could be in two months or in 15 years, so... 
MR. HILLYARD: I want to make sure. The motor home 
stays, as pei the stipulation, all accounts are split, 
personal property, he gets the crystal, the cedar chest, we 
get the Exhibit B, that will occur Saturday morning at 10:00 
a.m. He—she gets the retirement in Shriber's as indicated, 
he will maintain the life insurance, and I'm going to put 
the amount of $50,000 as long as there is an alimony 
obligation, alimony, we've handled, and attorney fees, we've 
handled; I think we've got — 
THE COURT: Yes. Any questions? 
Court will be in recess. 
MR. HILLYARD: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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